This chapter examines the future of Japan's hedged dependence on U.S. extended deterrence and encourages more imaginative thinking about potential outcomes and strategic implications as the "second nuclear age" unfolds.
Reassuring Japan is more challenging today, however, and how Tokyo sorts through its strategic choices is more pertinent than ever. Japan faces new nuclear threats and relative shifts in the regional balance of power. Although more accurate and more potent, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is now smaller and less visible, and the "second nuclear age" is ushering in a multipolar and less predictable nuclear landscape. 7 The United States withdrew the last of its land-based nuclear weapons from Asia in 1991 and reduced its overall nuclear stockpile by about 75% since then, and further reductions are being considered. 8 More recently, U.S. reassurance has focused on the capability and flexibility of specific systems, but this has been undercut by Washington's retirement of some that were earlier touted as being mission-critical. 9 Bilateral dialogue and closer policy coordination have become more important aspects of reassurance and deterrence for the alliance, but the degree to which this can mitigate rising Japanese concerns about North Korea and China is uncertain.
Japanese public opinion remains staunchly anti-nuclear, and Japan would likely be the last country in Northeast Asia to opt for nuclear arms. But while there are many domestic and international constraints on nuclear breakout, there are also signs of a more sophisticated debate in Japan about these issues as the demand for reassurance has escalated. The key questions are how Japan perceives its options, whether and how its calculus could change, and what this would mean for the region and the U.S.-Japan alliance.
To address these questions, this chapter examines the origins and current state of Japan's nuclear hedge and considers how deterrence and reassurance dynamics are evolving in the region. It then explores the prospects and implications for a nuclear breakout by Japan, as well as alternative strategic paths that Japan and the alliance can take. Although Japan's nuclear hedging strategy is likely to continue in the near future, U.S. policymakers (and those throughout the region) should not be sanguine about this strategy continuing indefinitely. Japan's choices will be determined ultimately by how well potential threats can be managed and by the strength of the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.
Japan's Current Posture
The evolution of Japan's nuclear posture owes as much to political circumstances as to a realistic assessment of U.S. capabilities and commitment. Japanese leaders have understood that pursuit of nuclear weapons is politically, diplomatically, and economically impracticable, but they also recognize that an independent nuclear deterrent is unnecessary as long as U.S.
guarantees remain credible to potential adversaries. As a result, Japan decided early on to deny itself nuclear weapons and instead hedge against changing circumstances.
Japan's nuclear hedge has two elements. The first involves confirming (and serially reconfirming) the U.S. commitment and capability to use nuclear weapons in defense of Japan.
In 1965, for example, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato asked Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to pledge to deploy nuclear weapons against China in the event of war. McNamara and President
Lyndon Johnson gave that assurance. Similar conversations have followed at various levels of government and the military, always backed by reassuring public statements from Washington.
In addition, for decades the Japanese government turned a blind eye to the possible introduction of U.S. ship-and aircraft-based nuclear weapons during port and base visits in Japan, despite its public pledge to forbid such practices. 10 Beginning in 1976, each of Japan's National Defense
Program Outlines has stated that Japan will depend on U.S. extended deterrence.
The second element involves Japan's maintenance of the foundation for its own nuclear weapons program, should the country ever make that choice. Former prime minister Nobusuke
Kishi believed that nuclear weapons were absolutely necessary if Japan were to have influence in world affairs, and he instructed his Cabinet Legislation Bureau in 1957 to formally pronounce that Japan's constitution allowed the country to possess nuclear weapons for self-defense. 11 An original member of Japan's Atomic Energy Commission recalled how "we were pressured 10 New York Times, March 9, 2010 and Norris, Arkin, and Burr, "Where They Were," 31. 11 Samuels, Securing Japan, 176. Kishi and then foreign minister Hisanori Yamada reportedly told MacArthur in 1958 that their government was exploring the nuclear weapons option. See Kyodo News, March 17, 2013. repeatedly to do basic research on how to make an atomic bomb." 12 Leading politicians have reasserted the constitutionality of nuclear weapons throughout the years, including current and former prime ministers Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso. 13 In addition, an important policy study by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) noted in 1969 that "regardless of joining the NPT or not, we will keep the economic and technical potential for the production of nuclear weapons, while seeing to it that Japan will not be interfered with in this regard." 14 Toward this latter end, and despite considerable opposition from within Japan and from the international community, Japan has never wavered from its early commitment to completing the nuclear fuel cycle. This commitment entails the maintenance of vigorous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, the stockpiling of separated plutonium, and the development of a fast breeder reactor (FBR) that other nations-most prominently the United States-have long since abandoned as too costly and dangerous. In fact, Japan has the largest nuclear-power program of any non-weapons state and is the only one with full-spectrum fuel cycle capabilities. 15 Of course, Japan's nuclear-power industry suffered a major blow after the 2011 tsunami-induced meltdowns at plants in Fukushima, and there are many legal, political, and technical restrictions that would make a Japanese nuclear breakout extremely difficult. Nonetheless, it has always been important for Japan to keep that option open.
Opening the Nuclear Umbrella
12 Jacques E.C. Hymans, "Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, 1967 Sato announced three non-nuclear principles of non-possession, non-manufacture, and nonintroduction. A year later he articulated the "four pillars" policy, and in 1970 the government signed the NPT, leaving no doubt about Japan's reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
22
One of the four pillars is the three non-nuclear principles, and this pillar is accompanied by three more: (1) promoting nuclear power for peaceful purposes, (2) promoting global nuclear disarmament, and (3) relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for protection from the international nuclear threat. The four pillars policy officially opened the nuclear umbrella, and even if it is perceived as leaky by some, this umbrella has remained open ever since. Although he privately called the three principles "nonsense," Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974.
Japan's "Basic Defense" Rationale and Its Latent Nuclear Deterrent
Around this time in the early 1970s, Japanese defense officials moved away from ambitious plans for a robust Self-Defense Force and adjusted to the political and economic realities of the time. A bellwether document penned in 1971 by Takuya Kubo, the director of the Defense Bureau of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), outlined a new direction toward basic defense. Kubo saw "no probable threats" to Japan and rationalized a small defense establishment and close alliance with the United States. 23 Kubo agreed with other leading strategic thinkers that nuclear weapons had limited military utility for Japan. The country was too dense and too small and would always lose more than it gained in a nuclear exchange. Moreover, adversaries were unlikely to believe that Japan would actually use its nuclear weapons-a lack of credibility that, The most prominent and credible element of Japan's latent weapons capability is its sophisticated nuclear-energy program and, in particular, its decades-long national commitment to completing the nuclear fuel cycle in the name of energy independence. This goal justifies reprocessing spent fuel and accumulating separated plutonium for use in a "pluthermal" mixedoxide (MOX) product. Extracting more energy from spent fuel by reusing it and operating FBRs that produce more fissile material than they consume can release Japan from its dependence on imported fuels. In theory, this energy strategy sounds sensible. The problem, however, is that the economics and engineering behind this MOX/FBR strategy are not working, and the plutonium continues to accumulate. 27 Japan's stocks of plutonium now vastly outweigh the amount needed for any plausible nuclear power or nuclear weapons program. One leading American expert suggests that today there is "enough plutonium in Japan to make 1,000 nuclear weapons." Japan's nuclear hedge requires that the connection between nuclear power and nuclear arms not be hidden. When the Japanese nuclear-power industry faced elimination after the March 2011 catastrophe in northeastern Japan, senior leaders-including Satoshi Morimoto, the incumbent defense minister in 2012-argued that nuclear power was the basis for a "latent deterrent" and must be preserved. Likewise, former defense minister Shigeru Ishiba said that it was "important to maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to produce a nuclear warhead in a short amount of time."
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A second element of Japan's nuclear hedge is the expertise in potential weapon-delivery platforms that the country has gained through its space program. 30 Although its primary spacelaunch vehicle, the H-II series is poorly suited as a missile-given its liquid-fuel composition- Studies of Japan's nuclear options do not agree on how quickly the country could establish a robust, survivable, independent nuclear deterrent-a much more challenging task than building a few bombs. Some conclude that Japan is technically capable of developing a nuclear weapon within a year (some studies even suggest six months or less), whereas others argue that it would take at least a decade. 35 It is widely acknowledged that Japan lacks expertise on bomb and warhead design, reliable delivery vehicles, intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities designed to protect and hide assets from a potential first strike, a comprehensive command-andcontrol system, and infrastructure to safely test weapons. 36 These are not trivial constraints that could be overcome immediately. For example, if Japan wanted a sea-based deterrent-an attractive option given its greater survivability-it would have to develop ballistic-missile submarines and possibly nuclear-powered ones. Likewise, the use of reactor-grade plutonium, though not impossible (and not likely Japan's first choice), would create new difficulties and take additional time.
There is, of course, an alternative and more likely route-using highly enriched uranium (HEU). The controversial Rokkasho nuclear enrichment plant has sophisticated centrifuges that provide Japan with a uranium-enrichment capability. Another, less likely, path to producing weapons-grade HEU could be a laser isotope-separation process, which Japan dabbled in for years before inefficiencies led to a cutback on implementation plans in 2001. Although laser enrichment is not commercially attractive, the know-how and equipment remain in Japan, and as we learned in the case of South Korea in 2004, experiments to produce HEU in small doses can be difficult for IAEA inspectors to detect.
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There are other skills in which Japanese researchers excel that are often neglected in discussions of Japan's latent deterrent. These include high-speed framing radiography, heavymetal shock physics, radiation hydrodynamics, and explosive shaping. Knowledge in these areas and others that are basic for development of a thermonuclear device is scattered throughout Japan's industrial and research communities. It is not uncommon for Japanese research scientists to attend and present papers at international conferences on shock compression or high-speed photonics also attended by nuclear weapons scientists from the United States, Russia, and
China. 38 These research activities have practical application in a wide range of non-military areas and are not necessarily telltale signs of a secret nuclear weapons research program. Indeed, while some policymakers in Tokyo would like to foster closer ties between Japan's scientists and defense planners, a wide gulf remains between the two communities. 39 It also appears that Japan lacks deep experience with other activities relevant to a weapons program such as plutonium metallurgy or beryllium machining, which could be helpful depending on what path Japan chose.
Still, Japan clearly has mature capabilities in certain areas, capabilities that are as relevant to its nuclear hedge as the country's plutonium stockpile. It is also evident that national policy recognizes the value of these programs in preventing both the United States and potential 37 In 2004, South Korean officials admitted to the IAEA that government scientists conducted HEU experiments in 2000 (without authorization) using laser isotope separation, successfully producing small amounts of nearly weapons-grade uranium. 38 For a more detailed assessment of Japan's technical and scientific capacity to produce nuclear weapons, see James adversaries from taking Japan's non-nuclear status for granted. In short, given Japan's level of technological sophistication, stable civil-military relations, accessible and plentiful plutonium stockpiles, self-contained nuclear fuel cycle, and history of success in "spinning on" commercial technologies, the country's nuclear hedge remains intact and credible.
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Extended Deterrence 2.0
The U.S.-Japan alliance and its extended deterrent have enabled the nonproliferation policies that help Tokyo signal its intention to refrain from breaking out with its own nuclear arsenal. Another vital factor has been the absence of a consistent existential threat to Japan.
Whenever one or both of these factors seems to shift, signs of reconsideration in Tokyo become apparent and subtle reminders that Japan has other nuclear options are issued to Washington.
Japan has long understood how important the nonproliferation objective is to the United States, and how to use it for policy leverage.
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Primacy of Reassurance
Japanese policymakers often remind their U.S. and regional counterparts (both privately and publicly) about the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and Japan's own ability to go analysts are worried that a policy designed for a bipolar world order will become less reliable in a multipolar environment filled with regional nuclear powers. Japan could, in this formulation, become "detached" from U.S. strategic thinking. 46 While some seek to prevent this through closer ties with Washington, others chafe under the postwar legal and diplomatic restraints that Japan agreed to live with for the sake of economic development; they would pursue a different postwar relationship with the United States by taking more security and diplomatic matters into their own hands.
Yet the Japanese express concern about extended deterrence in contradictory ways. homeland has become more realistic, they express concerns because Pyongyang's nukes could.
For example, a Sankei Shimbun editorial suggested that Washington could be "intimidated,"
quoting a former defense ministry official who opined that "we cannot completely rule out the possibility of Japan's being cut off from U.S. nuclear strategy."
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In the case of China, the allies' superiority in conventional forces appears more important than the nuclear balance for now, especially as the U.S. arsenal shrinks. This comes in part from a core challenge of extended deterrence, wherein a deterrence provider seeks to limit a conflict to the region it is protecting in order to avoid an all-out war that might entangle its homeland.
Based on this logic, while Washington will do everything it can to prevent the escalation or expansion of an East Asian regional conflict, if the U.S. military cannot dominate conventionally, Washington might default to accommodation rather than resort to nuclear weapons. As one former diplomat explained, "the conventional superiority advantage is critical, because it obviates the whole debate about whether or not Washington would 'sacrifice Los
Angeles to save Tokyo' in a nuclear exchange." 48 Consequently, even though nuclear weapons are a major psychological component of extended deterrence (and certainly the most talked about), Japan is also focused on the U.S. projection of conventional power, which is under strain from U.S. budget politics, Chinese military developments, and from Japan's unwillingness to invest in its own defense.
The United States' budget problems, coupled with its efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, exacerbate a concern some have in Japan over the long-term durability of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure. By some measures, U.S. nuclear capabilities have atrophied over time. Iran) and prompts other major powers to keep pace with their own military investments (e.g., China), further worrying regional allies like Japan. There is no easy balance that truly guarantees security through strength without feeding into a broader security dilemma. During this time, Japanese officials reportedly gave American interlocutors a "non-paper" that described key criteria for sustaining extended deterrence. The paper highlighted reliability (i.e., confidence that warheads will function properly), flexibility (holding different targets at risk), responsiveness, discrimination (keeping low-yield options), and the ability to be either stealthy or visible, as warranted by the situation. 53 While there was some doubt at the time about how high up this paper had been approved within the Japanese government, aspects of these criteria continue to be raised by Japanese officials, and the continuation of bilateral consultations on extended deterrence suggests that the allies have plenty to discuss. 54 These criteria appear to reflect real concerns in Japan that require continued alliance attention.
The success of the bilateral NPR consultations led both sides to want to continue talks, and 
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The site visits are thorough and underscore the fact that U.S. declaratory statements are backed by demonstrable capabilities, with the human capital being among the most important.
Site visits make the U.S. nuclear umbrella visible and tangible for Japanese officials, and they highlight the significant investments that support it. Both countries' principals hope that, over time, the EDD will also enhance deterrence by better integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities within the alliance for a tailored deterrence strategy, especially vis-à-vis North
Korea. The EDD also provides Japan with an official channel to share its perceptions about extended deterrence with the United States, which makes the dialogue a useful bellwether for how the Japanese government feels about its nuclear hedge.
The U.S. side reportedly is pleased that the EDD has deepened Japan's understanding of extended deterrence and provided a better appreciation of the role played by conventional forces and missile defense, including high-end missile-tracking radar deployments in Japan. 57 Still, the Japanese side appears to have an appetite for continued dialogue. Security planners in Tokyo acknowledge that discussions are "far deeper than before," but some express concern that
Washington will continue to surprise them. 58 Reaffirmation of U.S. commitments and reliability alone is no longer sufficient. The EDD portends a more collaborative form of deterrence that encompasses the full spectrum of conventional and nuclear capabilities possessed by the allies.
Japanese strategists who once expressed little more than "sheer and total dependence upon the American deterrent" now understand that assuaging their abandonment fear requires more Japanese involvement in lower (conventional) thresholds of potential conflict, and they seek greater input into Washington's nuclear doctrine and priorities. The EDD will have to balance this carefully.
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External Threats
While Washington has some control in addressing the reassurance factor, it faces limits when it comes to threats and threat perceptions. North Korea is a primary concern for Japan,
largely because Pyongyang appears to care little about its people and invests heavily in nuclear and missile programs. North Korea's nuclear capability could make the leadership even more reckless. Should the regime face imminent collapse or preemptive attack, it might judge that it 57 Huntley, "Speed Bump on the Road to Global Zero," 16, 21. has little to lose (and could even forestall outside interference) by striking Japan with a nuclear weapon. There are also questions about whether or not Pyongyang can maintain effective command and control over these weapons.
Washington's official assessments of North Korea's nuclear capability are written vaguely but express confidence that the North will be able to produce nuclear-tipped missiles in the not- or conflict. 67 In short, Japan faces its own threats and has its own interests. As Campbell and Sunohara suggest, "the persistence of a Japanese-American alliance so robust that it can indefinitely persuade Japanese leaders from acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be guaranteed."
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Prospects and Implications for a Nuclear Weapons Breakout by Japan
At the moment, the likelihood that Japan would build its own nuclear weapons is low.
Constraints are multiple and significant. But they are not fixed, and it is worthwhile to examine the conditions, both internal and external, under which these constraints could loosen and Japan might change course.
Internal Factors
Public opinion. The "nuclear allergy" metaphor was coined in part to describe the Japanese public's aversion to visits by U.S. Navy vessels that might be carrying nuclear weapons.
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Japanese perceptions were colored not only by the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 but also by other incidents, such as in 1954 when a U.S. nuclear test at Bikini Atoll exposed 23 Japanese fishermen to high levels of radiation, eventually killing one and inspiring the Godzilla film series that sensationalized the potential danger and unpredictable nature of nuclear weapons.
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It was against this backdrop that then prime minister Sato announced the three non-nuclear principles, a policy that maintains strong public support. As the Cold War wound down, polls
showed that more than 75% of Japanese respondents still agreed with the three principles, and 89% felt no need for Japan to have nuclear weapons. 71 Being a non-nuclear weapons state had, it seemed, become part of Japanese national identity. 72 The rise of China and the belligerency of North Korea, however, have raised awareness about the U.S. nuclear umbrella: only about 20% thought the umbrella was "necessary" in 1995, but almost half thought so in 2010. 73 Still, even when candidates for the national Diet were polled on the issue of Japan developing its own nuclear weapons after two North Korean nuclear tests, more than half did not think such an option should ever be considered; only a third favored
keeping this option open for the future, depending on the international situation. 74 The 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident hardened popular opinion against all things nuclear in Japan and led the government to shut down Japan's nuclear-power infrastructure. 75 Yet despite public opinion and a more independent regulatory system, the current Abe administration and private industry are pushing to revive and sustain the nuclear sector. With little organized political opposition to the conservative, business-friendly LDP government, we have seen Japan's nuclear industry begin to regain its footing. It is already aggressively pursuing development opportunities in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.
The return to power of the LDP in 2012 is a reminder that overwhelming majorities can vote against their polled preferences and that even democratic governments can act independently of public opinion. The connection of public opinion to policymaking is particularly tenuous with respect to national security. For example, there was considerable *DRAFT* opposition to the NPT from the media, business community, and public when Japan signed the treaty in 1970. 76 As we have seen, the decision to forgo an independent nuclear arsenal was based on realist calculations amid U.S. pressure, not on polling data. Campbell and Sunohara's conclusion is correct that "although public sentiment against nuclear weapons remains strong, its ability to fully inhibit the decisions of Japanese leaders should not be exaggerated."
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Institutional opposition. Japanese political leaders considering nuclear breakout will face other obstacles besides public opinion, including opposition from an expanding variety of political, bureaucratic, and economic actors. In the economic realm, there are those whose interests lie in preserving a purely commercial exploitation of nuclear power. 79 Japan's utilities, the wider business community, bureaucrats charged with promoting economic growth, and politicians with ties to these interests are all powerful actors who would likely oppose a nuclear weapons program. In the event of a nuclear breakout, Japan's electric-power industry could be crippled by a loss of access to nuclear fuel and would possibly be required to return current fuel stocks, given that their purchase was predicated on peaceful use. Moreover, large manufactures such as Hitachi and Mitsubishi could be shut out of overseas nuclear-development projects, and there might be a wider economic 76 George H. Quester, "Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Asian Survey 10, no. Although there is no question that weaponization would be difficult in Japan's contested political system, circumstances can change over time. Japan's robust democratic politics and its determined leadership have repeatedly demonstrated that opposition and veto power are not the same. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was ratified in 1960 over violent protests and widespread opposition and now is widely embraced. Japan's Self-Defense Forces, which began as the National Police Reserve during the Korean War, became a robust and lethal military force despite Japan's pacifist constitution and early public opposition. It has never been more widely embraced by the Japanese public than it is at present.
The postwar history of the Japanese military is filled with examples of government restrictions applied, only to be loosened at a later date. This was the case with Japan's acquisition of fighter jets (first denied, then allowed), as well as its acquisition of mid-air refueling capabilities, legislating an ability to deploy overseas, use of outer space for defense purposes, and now the possible development of a long-range strike capability. 82 Moreover, while approval for a weapons-related program surely would be even harder to obtain from local officials than approval for nuclear-power reactors, it is worth noting that some prefectural governors, such as Issei Nishikawa from Fukui, support nuclear power as the leading employment vehicle in their prefectures. And some governors, like Shintaro Ishihara of Tokyo, openly argued for acquiring 80 For further analysis of how nuclear plant exports have been central to Japan's "new growth strategy," see Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change. 81 Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Change, chap. 6-7. 82 The Japanese government has studied and considered acquisition of a long-range conventional strike capability in the past, most notably during the National Defense Finally, even if Japan's plutonium stockpile in Europe is out of reach and much of the separated fuel is controlled by private firms worried about repercussions in international markets, more than enough is held domestically under the aegis of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), a governmental unit. The rest is held by Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, which is nominally a private firm, but one that performs public functions under close government supervision. Even allowing that only two tons of Japan's plutonium stocks is both owned by the state (through the JAEA) and present in Japan, and that this might be the only plutonium available for Japanese weapons, this amount alone would be enough to build a large nuclear arsenal of several hundred weapons. In short, it is not clear how much of a constraint contending interests, private ownership of weapons materiel, and the overseas location of much of Japan's plutonium would actually place on Japan if it were to decide to move from being a latent to an open nuclear weapons state. The motivation is the critical factor, not the obstacles.
Discount Factors
There are four additional constraints that would require leaders to discount the costs of dramatic policy change: (1) the vulnerability of the Japanese population to a first strike, (2) the undermining of Japanese diplomacy, (3) regional instability, and (4) damage to bilateral relations with the United States.
Japan's central vulnerability is its lack of strategic depth. The argument here is straightforward and has often been repeated. The majority of the Japanese population is clustered in a small number of densely populated urban centers. Because a first strike against Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya would cripple Japan, nuclear weapons have little military utility. 83 While superficially compelling, this argument is hardly dispositive. It did not prevent Great Britain or Israel, with their similar geo-demographic profiles and same primary ally, from developing nuclear arsenals. The Israeli case, in fact, impressed some Japanese with how vulnerability can be discounted in the face of an existential threat. 84 Nor would we expect a strike on New York or *DRAFT* Los Angeles to be any less crippling to the U.S. national economy. Moreover, Japan's population density and vulnerability to a first strike-particularly when its arsenal is still limited-could provide a strong motivation to deploy an independent ability to wipe out North Korea's nuclear arsenal preemptively.
Second, there is the loss of benefits derived from Japan's diplomatic posture as a nonnuclear weapons state. Legal withdrawal from the NPT is technically very easy-it requires only a 90-day notice to the other parties to the treaty and the United Nations Security Council-but the costs associated with the repudiation of decades of Japanese diplomacy and the nullification of many of the bilateral agreements that undergird the Japanese nuclear-power program would require a steep discount by the country's decision-makers. Still, many of these leaders are concerned that the nonproliferation regime has been eroding, and Japanese diplomacy is already less strident on this point. Additionally, whether one agrees with this logic or not, supporters of a Japanese indigenous nuclear program have long argued that Japan neutered itself diplomatically by opting out of the nuclear club and that, from a realist perspective, Japan would fortify its diplomacy over the long run by changing its stance.
Third, a nuclear breakout would certainly trigger or accelerate a regional arms race-one that would require a considerably greater investment in defense than postwar Japan has heretofore accepted. If South Korea had not yet broken out, it surely would after a Japanese decision to do so. Koreans have long been suspicious of Japan's nuclear hedging, and the Korean media and its "unnamed" government sources regularly feed the perception that Japan is just a "few screwdriver turns" from a functioning weapon. 85 Even the former ambassador to Japan, Chul-hyun Kwon, explained on the record that "Japan didn't declare having nuclear weapons but they made the raw materials, and they…are in fact getting rid of the obstacles one by one as the opportunity offers. In the long term, I guess they are preparing for a nuclear weapon." 86 A Japanese nuclear breakout would not surprise the ROK, but neither would it be met with sympathetic understanding. China and Russia would likewise respond by repositioning and possibly strengthening their strategic forces, and China in particular would push to isolate Japan diplomatically. Additionally, North Korea could be convinced that its reckless behavior has been rewarded with new alignments in the region. It is understandable, then, that many in Japan see no military benefit to be gained from breakout; instead, they worry that a new, higher-cost round in the extant security dilemma would detract from Japanese national security. 87 But if Japan acted in response to a breakout by South Korea or to significant provocation by other states, then, as Nobumasa Akiyama suggests, "nuclear proliferation in Asia…might lower the threshold even for Japan to violate international agreements and treaties." States' refusal to act alone during the Arab Spring, it is not far-fetched to imagine Washington determining that it can no longer provide regional, much less global, strategic public goods on its own. In other words, it is hardly inconceivable that economic need and existential threat could trump vulnerability in nuclear strategy and overcome political constraint. years past, the United States' reassurance methods fluctuated, beginning with significant forward presence in the region (both conventional and nuclear) that paved the way for Japan's low-cost strategy of basic defense. When the Cold War ended and U.S. reliance on Japan seemed more equivocal, symbols of the United States' presence and commitment became important, such as the maintenance of force levels in the region above 100,000 personnel. 94 When U.S. force levels eventually dropped, Washington emphasized underlying capabilities as the critical factor, and this was also true on the nuclear front-for example, touting the TLAM/N to compensate for lower numbers and then conventional strength and dual-capable aircraft when the TLAM/N was retired. 95 If the allies' conventional advantage over China declines, however, and U.S. defense planners decide that U.S.-based strategic bombers can address nuclear threats more efficiently than introducing dual-capable aircraft into the theater, then Washington's "reassurance story"
Durability of the U.S. Security Umbrella amid New Threats
will no doubt need to change again.
Alternative Strategic Paths
To this point, our review of Japan's nuclear weapons options has elided at least four alternative paths to more independent nuclear deterrence for Japan within the alliance framework. The first three involve sharing nuclear weapons that are not of indigenous design and over which Japan would have less than full control. The fourth involves significant enhancement of Japan's conventional strike capabilities. All of these options would require major changes to Japanese defense policy and possibly constitutional reinterpretation or revision.
In the first of the three acquisition scenarios, Japan could opt to buy or lease U.S. weapons.
Japanese analysts have raised the possibility of a lease deal with a sunset provision for up to two hundred nuclear warheads with cruise missiles. Under the agreement, the United States would retain control over the electronic maps loaded onto the warheads and a right of launch refusal.
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94 See "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 17, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html. 95 For repeated emphasis of the role of "unrivaled" U.S. conventional military "preeminence," as well as mention of the option to forward deploy dual-capable aircraft and the potential value of a conventional "prompt global strike" weapon, see "Nuclear Posture Review Report," U. Although such an approach would still require Japan to cross many of the same legal and diplomatic hurdles that it would face in building its own deterrent, while adding new hurdles for the United States, it would be the quickest and cheapest way for Japan to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons and could be easily reversed if desired. For example, in the event of Korean unification and denuclearization, Japan could simply terminate the lease and return the weapons and infrastructure. Among the many complicating factors, it is hard to imagine the U.S.
government providing active support to a Japanese nuclear weapons program if South Korea is emphatically opposed. Presumably, Seoul would have taken a nuclear step first (with some sympathetic understanding from Washington) and would grudgingly accept a Japanese nuclear lease.
The second option could be modeled on the extant arrangement between the United States and the United Kingdom, whereby Britain leases U.S.-made Trident II missiles, co-develops aspects of the submarine platform, and manufactures its own nuclear warhead according to certain U.S. specifications, including the use of some U.S.-made non-nuclear components. 97 This approach would be less reversible and more expensive than the "turn key" lease method described above, but it would allow Japan to scale up its nuclear program more quickly and somewhat more affordably compared to home-grown options. Either of these approaches, however, assumes a U.S. attitude toward the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime that is fundamentally different from its current stance, and would be feasible only in the context of a collapse of the global nonproliferation regime. Still, one can imagine how U.S. policymakers could view this kind of approach as preferable to a purely indigenous Japanese effort, not only because it would maintain alliance ties but also because it would provide for a coordinated means of rollback if future conditions permitted.
A third alliance-based option could follow the NATO model of nuclear burden-sharing, by which U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed on allied territory under U.S. control until a crisis erupts. At that point, following U.S. authorization, responsibility for the delivery of the weapons devolves to the allied host state. 98 Before then, the ally would participate in command and control arrangements and its pilots would be trained in nuclear warfighting doctrine. Although such burden-sharing arrangements were more widespread during the Cold War, there remain approximately 150 B-61s deployed at bases controlled by the allied host nations Turkey, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany for delivery by their F-16s or Tornados. The legality of these arrangements, however, has long been disputed under Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT. 99 Each of these options goes beyond Japan possessing a few bombs but falls short of a fully independent and survivable Japanese nuclear force. All three would, of course, require relaxation of Japan's three non-nuclear principles and the reintroduction of U.S. nuclear weapons to bases on the archipelago. Each would allow more rapid deployment than a purely indigenous deterrent, and each requires U.S. cooperation. Many Japanese analysts who write on nuclear issues, however, advocate greater autonomy. Nisohachi Hyodo, for example, has argued for a force of two submarines roaming separate seas with one missile each, while Kan Ito and Yasuhiro Nakasone recommend "small size" Japanese nuclear weapons. 100 Mitsuo Takai argues, however, that a reliably survivable Japanese nuclear strategy to deal with China or North Korea would require a much larger force-up to six nuclear submarines with three hundred high-yield nuclear warheads-while Takayuki Nishi has suggested that even this might be too small a force to deal with a foe like China. 101 Either way, this level of militarization would contradict the Japanese Constitution's prohibition of "war potential," as currently interpreted by the government, which makes a distinction based on scale of destructive power. 102 Ultimately, Nishi's consideration of nuclear strategy convinces him that the best approach for Japan remains nuclear abstention coupled with missile defenses, as long as the growth of China's nuclear missile force levels off.
surface-to-surface missile technology. 108 But the LDP's coalition partner, the New Komeito Party, vetoed that proposal and the plan was dropped. The Abe administration put this issue back on the table for consideration in 2013 after South Korea's decision in 2012 to extend the range of its ballistic missile forces to eight hundred kilometers provided diplomatic cover. Such a shift could enhance Japan's deterrence posture, whether or not it were integrated with U.S. military doctrine in ways that would make deterrence more effective and credible; however, it also risks complicating the regional security dilemma and engendering domestic political blowback.
Washington has long pushed for a more militarily capable Japan but is reluctant to weigh in publicly on this sensitive issue, lest the United States be viewed as either encouraging or restraining Japan. On this latter point, in particular, the U.S. side is aware that efforts to dissuade
Tokyo from adding strike capacity could be unsuccessful and might accelerate the loss of Japanese confidence in its ally, thereby prompting an even quicker development of independent capabilities.
Conclusion
Henry Kissinger has suggested that the logic of war shifted with the introduction of nuclear weapons in ways that are connected directly to issues examined in this chapter. He stated that before the nuclear age, "the consequences of abandoning an ally were deemed to be more risky than fulfilling one's obligations. In the Nuclear Age, this rule no longer necessarily held true;
abandoning an ally risked eventual disaster, but resorting to war at the side of an ally guaranteed immediate catastrophe." 109 It is of no little significance that this passage is well known among Japan's strategic elites, many of whom point to the declining credibility of extended deterrence and the fact that nonproliferation norms have also withered.
Campbell and Sunokawa, who insist that a Japanese nuclear breakout "would be potentially catastrophic," have warned U.S. leaders and public commentators against raising questions about extended deterrence or encouraging Japan to consider alternatives to its nuclear hedged status quo: "American leaders and influential commentators both within and outside the government should never signal to the Japanese, even inadvertently, that they actually favor Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons." 110 But as we have seen, thoughtful Japanese security specialists have not needed encouragement to cast an unsentimental and realistic eye on the future of extended deterrence. They have needed no prompting to raise questions about Japan's strategic defense and to interrogate U.S. overextension.
Equally thoughtful international security specialists in the United States have begun asking similar questions. Michael J. Mazarr, a professor of national security strategy at the U.S.
National War College, is concerned about U.S. "strategic insolvency"-the pursuit of "yesterday's strategy under today's constraints" and the United States' growing inability to manage the gap between its strategic commitments and its national objectives. 111 Barry Posen argues that extended deterrence is a very risky business, and the United States ought to have been glad to shed such commitments after the Cold War ended. Instead, the United States retains extended deterrence commitments in Europe and Asia…. Extended deterrence remains a plausible path to one or more nuclear weapons being used either against U.S. forces or the U.S. homeland.
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Posen lays out four options for Japan beyond its alliance with the United States. Two are lowprobability courses of action: that Japan could find a new nuclear protector or that it could bandwagon with China or other rivals. Echoing some of the strategists explored in this chapter, Posen observes that a third option is for Japan to persist with its nuclear hedge, which he says is tantamount to "ignoring the problem" and which one Diet representative called "closing our eyes and whistling past the graveyard." 113 The fourth option, nuclear breakout, is the one that has been explored in this chapter in its several possible forms.
Like Israel, which has climbed much higher up the nuclear weapons ladder, Japan has assumed what Vipin Narang labels a "catalytic posture," one that "relies on an ambiguous nuclear capability aimed at 'catalyzing' third-party-often U.S.-military or diplomatic 110 Campbell and Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable," 219, 246. assistance to defend the state by threatening to unsheathe its nuclear weapons." 114 To assume this posture, having assembled nuclear weapons is not even strictly necessary-one simply requires the "ability to assemble a handful of nuclear weapons." Given the availability of a superpower patron and other constraints on more overt change, this posture may continue to serve Japanese security interests well and is Tokyo's most likely choice should it opt to follow Israel.
Manipulating the threat of breakout remains a mechanism to keep Washington in the game in East Asia.
Still, as this chapter has shown, much remains uncertain in the changing East Asian security environment. North Korea, in particular, is an unpredictable actor and a growing threat to alter Tokyo's calculus. At present, few voices in the Japanese or U.S. strategic communities openly advocate a Japanese nuclear breakout. But given questions about how the emergence of a multipolar nuclear Asia will complicate national and alliance strategies, the possibility cannot be dismissed. Both communities should be aware that extant constraints on such a dramatic shift can be stretched, that threat perceptions can change, and that a range of once unthinkable alternatives is available.
